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Upon the fields of friendly strife are sown the seeds that, upon other fields, on other days will bear the fruits of victory.
planted in response to the force-on-force car nage of World War I, the ideas germi nated in the rough growing season of the inter war pe riod, and the blooming of doctrine during World War II with its actual employ ment on the battle fields and oceans of the world. These men are still impor tant and rele vant to day be cause they in flu enced two im por tant ar eas. The first area is doctrine-how their serv ice should best go about do ing its mis sion when defend ing the United States. The sec ond area is their influ ence on organi za tion, train ing, allo ca tion of resources, force struc ture, and person nel. These issues are very much a part of the "jointness" debate, par ticu larly the doctrinal debate within the Air Force today.
The funda men tal question this arti cle attempts to an swer is, In times of great change, how do success ful transfor ma tional military lead ers guide or attempt to guide their ser vices through these peri ods? To answer this ques tion as the Air Force turns 50 and prepares for a new century, the arti cle follows these three extraor di nary leaders from their early years during the inter war period, exam ines their doctrinal legacy, and parlays their ex pe ri ence into lessons learned.
While not as famous (or infa mous) as some "great captains" in military history, John Archer Leje une, William Moffett, and Billy Mitchell compare favora bly with histo ry's great contribu tors to military theory and doc trine. They were contem po rar ies and made their mark by influ enc ing future serv ice organi za tion and doctrine during their life time. Also, their influ ence on service doc -Douglas MacArthur trine and organi za tion did not manifest itself in combat effec tive ness or insti tu tional rec og ni tion un til af ter all three were long re tired or deceased.
Dur ing the 1920s, General Leje une led the Ma rine Corps through the insti tu tional equiva lent of winter ing at Valley Forge. He fos tered a climate in which the Marine Corps re de fined itself to adopt amphibi ous assault and maneu ver warfare doctrine, ulti mately sav ing the corps. Admi ral Moffett walked softly but carried a big insti tu tional stick in mas ter ing the Washing ton politi cal scene as head of the Navy's Bureau of Aeronau tics-a venue that allowed him a secure in sti tu tional fo rum to champion the airplane's role in revo lu tion iz ing naval warfare. And, finally, Gen eral Mitchell campaigned relent lessly to heighten what he consid ered to be insti tu tional neglect of airpow er's poten tial in warfare. He argued vehe mently for an inde pend ent air force to effec tively manage this new di men sion in military technol ogy. But, like many of histo ry's forward thinkers, Mitchell did not live to see his dream real ized.
The journey with these remark able men be gins with John Archer Leje une. Of the three, Leje une is the most revered of the trio due to his lasting impact on the daily life of the corps, includ ing the empha sis on extem po ra ne ous speaking by its offi cers, the estab lish ment of the first profes sional military jour nal (the Ma rine Corps Gazette), and the ini tia tion of the tradi tion of formally cele brat ing the corps's birthday on 10 Novem ber any where in the world where two or more ma rines gather. "Some where in their history," writes Tom Clancy, "the members of the [Marine] Corps seem to have gotten a reputa tion for be ing simple-minded jarheads," when in fact they "have been among the most inno va tive of the world's military forces." 2 The man most respon si ble for initi at ing that doc trinal in no va tion and sus tain ing a meas ure of intel lec tual rigor in the service was Gen eral Leje une, the 13th comman dant of the Marine Corps.
Al though Leje une grew up poor in post-Civil War Louisi ana, he retained happy childhood memories of gather ing honey and hunting small game with his dad. In 1881 Leje une became a military ca det at Louisi ana State Univer sity. Three years later, he entered the US Naval Acad emy, Class of 1888. Follow ing graduation, his man da tory cruise, and an other set of rigor ous exams, Leje une found that he "nur tured a grow ing dis like for life at sea and the Navy in particu lar." 3 So he fought hard, show ing shrewd politi cal skills that he would employ throughout his career, to se cure a commis sion in the Marine Corps. This was a career deci sion newly opened to his year group, but it was highly un usual by Navy standards. Leje une person ally made his case to the Bureau of Naviga tion chief, who ulti mately allowed Leje une to transfer serv ices but told the persis tent cadet, "You have too many brains to be lost in the Marine Corps." 4 Early assign ments took Leje une to the west ern United States, the Carib bean and Cuba during the Spanish-American War, and Mex ico at the be gin ning of the Mexi can Revo lu tion. Several years later, he im pressed many by his perform ance at Army War College. At the time, he was one of the few ma rines to at tend sen ior serv ice school. From 1915 to 1917, Leje une served as assis tant to the comman dant, where he learned the intri ca cies of Washing ton politi cal life. Prior to US in volve ment in World War I, Le je une commanded the Overseas Depot at Quan tico. 5 Briga dier General Leje une arrived in France in June 1918 and quickly made an im pact. The American Expe di tion ary Force (AEF) commander, Gen John Pershing, re sisted attempts by the Marine Corps leadership, includ ing Leje une, to employ the corps in an am phibi ous role in the Bal tic or Adri atic Sea. Pershing argued that "our land forces must be homo ge ne ous in every respect" and ad vised against their use as a separate division. 6 Leje une's reputa tion among the AEF sen ior staff, many of whom he knew from Army War College, was impec ca ble. In Europe, Le je une com manded the Army's 64th In fan try Brigade and the 4th Marine Brigade be fore earning his second star and assum ing com mand of the 2d Marine In fan try Di vi sion on 28 July 1918. 7 Even though he would later serve nine years as Marine Corps comman dant, Leje une consid ered this the pinna cle of his military career. The 2d Divi sion con ducted sustained ground opera tions with dis tinc tion in France. Unlike Pershing's style of in timi dat ing subor di nates, Leje une chose to lead by gaining the "loyalty and devo tion of his men." 8 From the Armi stice to the middle of 1919, Leje une's divi sion occu pied an area around the bridgehead at Coblenz on the Rhine. He returned from Europe later that year. After meeting with President Woodrow Wil son and the man he would soon re place as Ma rine Corps comman dant, Maj Gen George Bar nett, Leje une returned to Virginia and assumed command of the new Marine train ing center at Quantico. 9 It is said that success ful military offi cers, in addi tion to being extremely capa ble, have mentors who help them along. In Leje une's case, his rela tion ship to Sec re tary of the Navy Jose phus Dan iels was key. Dan iels had admired Leje une's straightfor ward and profes sional style when Leje une served as assis tant to the comman dant from 1914-17. In addi tion, Leje une had an im pres sive war record, a great mind, and the lead er ship skills neces sary to run the corps. Dan iels had never supported General Barnett as comman dant. In fact, Barnett had got ten the job over Daniels's objec tions. In the summer of 1920, when it appeared that a Repub li can would capture the White House, Dan iels ousted Bar nett and re placed him with Leje une, whom the Democrats sup ported.
Le je une's change of command was as un cere mo ni ous as it was brief. Before noon on 30 June 1920, Leje une reported to Barnett's of fice. Barnett asked him why he failed to inform him of Daniels's plot. Leje une replied that his hands were tied. Barnett ordered Leje une to stand at atten tion in front of his desk. The outgo ing comman dant charged his sub or di nate with disloy alty, unpro fes sional con duct, and being a false friend. At twelve o'clock, Barnett ordered an aide-de-camp to re move one star from his (Barnett's shoul ders) and marched out of the office without so much as a handshake with Leje une. 10 Af ter Warren Harding's election in No vem ber, the Sen ate set aside Le je une's con firma tion until the new president took office. 12 Af ter the war, Moffett gained a key as signment as commander of the battle ship Mis sis sippi. While skip per of the Mis sis sippi, he wit nessed the bat tle ship Texas oper at ing with "flying-off platforms" that enabled small aircraft to be flown off the ship. But the wheeled planes could not recover on the platforms, hav ing to either land ashore or ditch alongside the ship after complet ing their missions. Not to be out done, Mof fett had his men build 26 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998 flying-off platforms on his ship. The Mis sis sippi op er ated with a pair of Sopwith Camels while in Guantánamo, Cuba. 13 The dual ex pe ri ence at the Great Lakes Na val Train ing Cen ter and the aircraft tests off the battle ship inspired Moffett, who was slowly becom ing a na val airpower enthu si ast.
In early 1919, Lt Comdr Jerome Hunsaker re turned from Europe aboard the same ship as Army general and airpower advo cate Billy Mitchell. Hun saker warned his su pe ri ors that Mitchell meant business. In early April that year, Mitchell appeared before the Navy's Gen eral Board and testi fied that warships could not effec tively de fend them selves from air attack and that land-based aircraft could de fend the nation's coastlines out as far as one hundred miles.
14 That claim rankled the stodgy naval leader ship. But more alarming to naval aviators were Mitchell's calls that "they [the Navy] and their air planes . . . be in cor po rated into an inde pend ent air force."
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For Mof fett, Mitchell's as ser tions rep re sented an insti tu tional slap in the face regard ing the Navy's insti tu tional preroga tives to defend the fleet with its organic, land-based air arm and the evolving aircraft carrier.
Af ter he relin quished command of the Missis sippi in Decem ber 1920, Moffett was se lected by Adm Robert Coontz, chief of na val opera tions, to be direc tor of naval avia tion. The job carried little admin is tra tive author ity as part of the all-powerful Bu reau of Navi ga tion. That soon changed. Mitchell's calls for a separate air arm, combined with con gres sional will to focus on the devel op ment of military aviation, brought the issue front and cen ter in Washing ton. The new Harding admin is tra tion sup ported con gres sional efforts to estab lish a "central ized Bu reau of Aeronau tics in the Navy Depart ment." Edwin Denby, the new secre tary of the Navy, con sid ered the bu reau a vi tal ne ces sity. By April 1921, Moffett, who came into the job somewhat ambiva lent about airpower, was soon a true believer in naval avia tion and testi fied before Congress in support of the separate bureau. An oppo nent of Mitchell, Sen. Miles Poindex ter (R-Wash.) made an impas sioned speech on the Senate floor support ing the bureau. In mid-July, both houses passed the bill, and President Harding signed the law that created and es tab lished in the De part ment of the Navy a Bu reau of Aeronau tics headed by a chief and ap pointed by the president for a four-year term. Af ter Harding appointed Moffett to his first term, Presi dents Cal vin Coo lidge and Her bert Hoo ver reap pointed him. 16 Mof fett real ized relatively late the signifi cance of airpower in both its offen sive role and as a weapon for fleet defense. In fact, many his to ri ans ar gue that Billy Mitchell was re spon si ble for making Moffett and the Navy what Mitchell's biog ra pher Alfred Hurley calls be ing "air con scious." No mat ter the real rea son for his conver sion, Moffett, armed with his newfound authority, was more than ready for the bat tle with Mitchell to de cide in sti tu tional control over this emerging tech nol ogy.
A man might be a flyer and still be an egregious ass. In fact, I think there have recently been some instances of that kind.
-Sen. Miles Poindexter Mitchell, born in France in 1879, came into a world of some com fort. His grand fa ther was a self-made million aire and his father a United States sena tor-cir cum stances Mitchell would later call a "fair founda tion" upon which he built his aviation career.
General Mitchell's bombing tests. Many historians argue that Billy Mitchell was responsible for making [Admiral] Moffett and the Navy "air conscious."
earned their commis sions at the prestig ious and rigor ous Naval Academy, Mitchell ob tained his com mis sion with rela tive ease. "Influ ence," he once wrote, "cuts a larger figure in this war than merit." 18 So from his earli est ex pe ri ences, born into a fam ily of wealth and re ceiv ing a commis sion through influ ence, one can trace the roots of Mitchell's procliv ity for get ting his way and hav ing a lack of re spect for insti tu tional preroga tives.
Mitchell earned his wings at his own ex pense in early 1917. But it soon paid divi dends. Either through merit, extraor di nary luck, or his family's politi cal influ ence, the War Depart ment sent him to Europe as an aero nau ti cal observer. He arrived in France just two weeks before the United States de clared war on Germany. During the war, Mitchell commanded an Army engi neer regi ment in General Leje une's 2d Divi sion and headed the Army Air Serv ice in France. He was less inter ested in regular Army command of troops, focus ing instead on learning more about the appli ca tion of airpower in war. He also became somewhat of an Anglo phile. "In ques tions ranging from their grooming of horses to their worldview, Mitchell believed the British to be vastly supe rior." 19 The im pres sion able Major Mitchell flattered Maj Gen Hugh Trenchard, commander of the Royal Flying Corps in France, into reveal ing his views on the role of the air weapon of the pres ent and of the future. Mitchell even took on some of Trenchard's blunt person al ity traits.
Al fred Hurley writes that the British gen eral believed intensely, and influ enced Mitchell's belief, in the air offen sive and that com mand of the air over the battle field was pos si ble only through "relent less and inces sant of fen sive." 2 0 Other early theo rists also influ enced Mitchell. Giu lio Douhet and Basil H. Lid dell Hart claimed strate gic airpower was "the only so lu tion to the grisly in de ci sive ness of ground war fare." 21 Af ter the Royal Air Force (RAF) was created in 1918, Winston Chur chill, minis ter for war and air, declared that "the first duty of the RAF is to garri son the Brit ish Empire." 22 The RAF was initially cre ated to hold down costs of maintain ing or der in the British Empire, although another prin ci pal employ ment doctrine the RAF devel oped between the wars stressed inde pend ent air opera tions against the enemy's mate rial and moral resources. Heavily influ enced by Tren chard, Douhet, Liddell Hart, and by RAF op era tions during the war and after, Mitchell be gan to form ideas on how air power ap plied to defend ing the United States.
Mitchell drew many of his ideas from Tren chard, espe cially the funda men tal conclu sion that airpower was primar ily an instru ment for of fen sive, not defen sive, employ ment. Mitchell em braced Tren chard's con cepts on air su prem acy and demon strated them as chief of the Air Service, 1st Brigade. By the time of the Saint-Mihiel offen sive of Septem ber 1918, Mitchell was chief of the Air Serv ice, First Army, Ameri can Expe di tion ary Force. 23 Dur ing the war and shortly af ter, four fun da men tal points (while not de fined as such at the time) became clear in Mitchell's mind and would guide his zealous advo cacy in the years to come. First and second, he was con vinced the airplane repre sented a military tech nol ogy revolu tion which would, in turn, prompt a revo lu tion in mili tary af fairs. Third, this new tech nol ogy must be used of fen sively to gain command of the air. And finally, an in de pend ent air force would be neces sary to con soli date the revolu tions and theory into sound employ ment doctrine. Armed with this reve la tion, Mitchell re turned home from the war like an evangel ist who had seen the light and was more than ready to preach the faith to the igno rant.
Mitchell kept his briga dier gen eral rank af ter the war. But regard less of Mitchell's suc cess, the War Depart ment consid ered him a loose cannon and placed him under the su per vi sion of a nonflyer, Maj Gen Charles Meno her, the new direc tor of the Air Service.
Disaster and Technology: The Roots of Doctrine after the Great War
This war has marked us for generations. It has left its imprint upon our souls. All those inflamed nights of Verdun we shall rediscover one day in the eyes of our children.
-Artillery Lieutenant de Mazenod
The hu man suf fer ing and physi cal dev as ta tion person ally witnessed by Mitchell 
It seemed like a good idea to the Euro pean powers when they jumped naked into the "briar patch" in 1914. But the human and mate rial costs of the war were stagger ing. Con sid er ing all those killed or wounded in action and civil ian deaths re sult ing from disease, famine, priva tion, and war time birth defects-the final casu alty list for the war and beyond might have been as much as 60 million people. Some economists have cal cu lated the war cost the world econ omy $260 billion, which "repre sented about six-and-a-half times the sum of all the na tional debt accu mu lated in the world from the end of the eighteenth century up to the eve of the First World War." 24 The re ver bera tions of that war were felt most strongly in Europe, where lead ers pledged it would never hap pen again. The war had also pro foundly changed America. The nation was now a reluc tant world power.
For some, the Great War repre sented a chasm between the simple nineteenth-centur y world of their youth and the indus tri al ized post war "Roar ing Twen ties" Amer ica. Writ ers like Willa Cather and F. Scott Fitzgerald la mented the loss of their uncom pli cated world. Cather expressed that feeling best in her Pulitzer-prize-winning novel One of Ours, about Nebras kan farm boy Claude Wheeler. "The army, the war, and France," she wrote, "com bined to give Claude the youth he had never had." When he had had it, he might die. In deed, Willa Cather in sists it was best he should. When he is killed in the fall of 1918, it was "believ ing his own country is better than it is, and France better than any country can ever be. These beliefs would have per ished had he seen the postwar world." 25 Postwar America was a place of extraor di nary so cial, economic, and techno logi cal change. It was "an age of peace." Billy Mitchell hardly la mented the pass ing of the stuffy nineteenth century. He cele brated the new age of high tech nol ogy and all of its possi bili ties. Mitchell was a real ist who be lieved the war to end all wars did not live up to its name and that the so-called peace trea ties that ended it did not herald a return to world peace. His expe ri ence in the war con vinced him that in the next world war, which was inevi ta ble, airpower would prevent the 1914-18 carnage from reoc cur ring.
"Dur ing the 1920s, the most sensa tional epi sodes in Ameri can avia tion were Mitchell's demon stra tion in 1921 of how bomb ers could sink bat tle ships and Char les Lind bergh's flight across the Atlan tic in May 1927." 2 6 In discuss ing Billy Mitchell's im pact during the volatile postwar era, histo rian Michael Sherry asked, "How could individu al ism persist in the wake of mass war and in the midst of mass culture?" 27 In gen eral, he says, the American public came to accept the bomber as an instru ment of war fare due in part to the hero ics of Mitchell and Lindbergh. Although the con cept of fu ture aer ial war was purely ab stract for most Americans, they felt a sense of se cu rity in airpower, and their attrac tion to it deep ened during the 1920s. "Al most from the begin ning," writes Isaac Don Levine, another Mitchell biog ra pher, "Mitchell's struggle for air power took on the char ac ter of a chal lenge to sea power . . . es pe cially the battle ship." 29 Here lies the crux of the insti tu tional battles for control of whether the Army and Navy would maintain sepa rate air arms or whether airpower would be controlled by an inde pend ent air force. Presi dent Harding en cour aged the mili tary to
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In short, the Air Force needs a tamer Billy Mitchell. plan new strategies and move into new weap ons devel op ment, espe cially after limits on capi tal ship devel op ment were agreed to by the world naval powers partici pat ing in the Wash ing ton Na val Con fer ence, which his admini stra tion had spon sored. Harding be came a strong advo cate of airpower and was in trigued by Mitchell's ideas. 30 Al ready the line was being drawn all over the world between the two schools of thought on the issue of capi tal ships. Mitchell's vi sion of na tional de fense deep ened the line, and his drive to dem on strate that the battle ship was a weapon of the past was cal cu lated to bring the con flict to a head. 31 Mitchell's pub lic cam paign for government-sponsored bombing tests on Navy battle ships finally paid dividends in early 1921. The New York Times edito ri al ized that the nation could not afford to ignore Mitchell's claims. 32 Mitchell won this battle with the Navy but would lose the ensu ing bu reau cratic war. In ad di tion, Mitchell's de- 30 
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mands for bomb ing tests woke up the Navy to the sig nifi cance of aviation-to what Al fred Hurley calls the Navy's "aviation con scious ness." In pursu ing this new con scious ness, the Navy had the clear
Mitchell's battles with Moffett and
the Navy and his public airpower advocacy eventually led the Army to successfully marginalize his influence within the institution by trying him for insubordination.
ad van tage in institutional and bureau cratic infra struc ture to suc cess fully battle Mitchell. In July 1921, Con gress author ized the Bureau of Aeronau tics to be headed by Ad mi ral Moffett, who proved to b e a shrewder campaigner than Mitchell and one of his most formi da ble antago nists. 3 3 While the airplane fasci nated Mitchell and most Ameri cans, it height ened Navy aware ness to the im pli ca tions of airpower to fleet de fense and caused huge fissures within the Navy bureauc racy. Moffett's biog ra pher, William Trimble, argues that as chief of the Bu reau of Aero nau tics, Mof fett's con sid er able po liti cal skills en abled him to suc cess fully wage a three-front campaign to make Washing ton more conscious of naval air. 34 He had first to confront some of the lower-ranking true believ ers like Henry Mustin and Kenneth Whiting, both naval avia tors and "ardent con verts to avia tion and un swerv ing in their certainty that the airplane would revolu tion ize naval warfare." 35 Some of them advo cated estab lish ing a sepa rate aviation corps within the Navy, which Mof fett opposed. He felt separa tion would pre vent the full inte gra tion of aviation into the fleet. Then there were the "battle ship ad mi rals" who scorned naval aviation and ran the all-powerful Bu reau of Navi ga tion, which had a vir tual stran gle hold on per son nel se lec tion, assign ment, and promo tion. Fi nally, on the third front was Billy Mitchell. Mitchell ar gued that the airplane and the airship brought an entirely new dimen sion to warfare and that aviation alone could fight and win the nation's wars. He believed that longrange bombers had such enormous destruc tive capac ity that neither navies or armies could re sist it. Mitchell be lieved strongly that to fully real ize airpow er's military poten tial, it was neces sary to have a separate air force "sup plied with the most up-to-date equip ment, flown by trained air person nel, and led by of fi cers who were un en cum bered by ties to ei ther the Army or the Navy." 36 Dur ing the tumul tu ous 1920s, Moffett deftly choreo graphed the growing airpower de bate in the Navy's favor by simul ta ne ously suc cor ing his naval aviation colleagues, sooth ing the admi rals who were battle ship cur mudg eons, and bureau crati cally outma neu ver ing Billy Mitchell.
There was no profes sional love lost between Moffett and Mitchell. Their most pub lic confron ta tion came during the Washington Naval Confer ence when they both served on a special subcom mit tee to consider the quan ti ta tive and quali ta tive limi ta tions of aircraft. As Moffett recalled, "When Mitchell breezed in with a secre tary, all ready to take the chair, I in quired by what author ity he pretended to assume the chairman ship. He mum bled something about rank. 'Since when,' I de manded, 'does a one-star briga dier rate a two-star admi ral?' That stopped him." 3 7 To keep him out of more mischief, Mitchell was whisked off to Europe on an inspec tion tour of military aviation facili ties. Maj Gen Ma son Patrick repre sented Army aviation for the balance of the confer ence.
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The Doctrine Articulated
The history of warfare is the history of doctrine. . . . We have a doctrine for landing on beaches, a doctrine for bombing, a doctrine for AirLand Battle. . . . What is missing . . . is a doctrine for information.
-Paul Strassmann
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Few doubt Mitchell's genu ine be lief in the ef fi cacy of strate gic airpower to strike enemy vi tal cen ters and the need for an in de pend ent air force to most effec tively employ the new est weapon the military instru ment pos sessed. Nonethe less, Mitchell's battles with Mof fett and the Navy and his pub lic air power ad vo cacy eventu ally led the Army to successfully marginal ize his influ ence within the in sti tu tion by trying him for insub or di na tion. Mitchell knew that his public statements left the Army little choice but to act. He calcu lated that the public ity of a trial and beyond, al though leaving him virtu ally irrele vant within the insti tu tion, would further his goals for air power and al low him the free dom to speak his mind through the media and or gani za tions such as the American Legion and what we know today as the Air Force Asso cia tion. At the same time, Leje une and Moffett, while equally frustrated by the bureau cratic tan gling over their attempts to shape and influ ence service doctrine regard ing amphibi ous warfare and naval aviation, success fully made their case within insti tu tional bounda ries.
As Sir Michael Howard points out in his bril liant Chesney Memo rial Gold Medal Lec ture in 1973, "The military profes sion is, like other pro fes sions, also a bu reauc racy, and bu reauc ra cies accom mo date themselves with great dif fi culty to out stand ing origi nal think ers. Such people tend to be diffi cult col leagues, bad organi za tion men." 39 Mitchell was well ahead of his time in advo cat ing stra te gic bombing, in warning of the threat from Ja pan, in rec om mend ing a de part ment of na tional defense, and in encour ag ing jointness. While none of these ends were evidence of origi nal thinking, much of what he advo cated had consid er able merit and was worth se ri ous con sid era tion. But his means in ad vo cat ing and publi ciz ing his views were funda men tally flawed.
As late as 1928, the Army General Staff viewed airpower as essen tially an auxil iary func tion and gave ob ser va tion planes pri or ity over bombers at budget time. Mitchell saw it quite differ ently. Influ enced as he was by Giu lio Douhet and Hugh Tren chard, Mitchell did not deny the useful ness of obser va tion, pur suit, and short-range bombard ment, but be lieved that military aviation's greatest po ten tial lay in its offen sive capa bil ity. The outcome of a war could be de cided by long-range bomb ers. 40 His brash style when advo cat ing airpower while on ac tive duty con tin ued af ter ward in a se ries of arti cles, speeches, and radio broadcasts. Mitchell argued that "the air force has ceased to remain a mere auxil iary service for the purpose of assist ing an army or navy in the execu tion of its task." 41 In two arti cles in Col lier's magazine, he made an impas sioned case for an air force to deny enemy air attacks and used New York to illus trate his vital cen ters theory. Mitchell pointed out that attacks on civil ian popula tions would have enor mous im pact on the out come of a con flict and should be con sid ered a key cen ter of grav ity. 42 Even with Mitchell offi cially out of the Air Serv ice, students and faculty at the Air Corps Tac ti cal School (ACTS) at Maxwell Field, Ala bama, agreed with Mitchell's asser tions of strik ing the enemy's vital centers instead of un der tak ing massive battles of attri tion. ACTS theorists argued that the key to victory in modern warfare relied upon destruc tion and/or paraly sis of a country's support ing in fra struc ture. The most suitable objec tives for this pur pose were the hos tile air force, troops, sup plies, lines of commu ni ca tion, and indus trial and transpor ta tion centers. ACTS inte grated the theo ries of Douhet, Tren chard, and Mitchell and added a rig or ous sys tem analy sis of an adver sary's ability to conduct and sus tain war, thus ulti mately creat ing its strate gic bom bard ment theory. 43 Be cause Mitchell could no longer directly in flu ence airpower theory after leaving the Army, ACTS became the key link that trans lated his and other early airpower theorists' ideas into doc trine. The four ACTS in struc tors who wrote Air War Planning Document-1 (AWPD-1) in just nine days in 1941 made their own theoreti cal contri bu tions to the docu ment but relied heavily on the ideas of Mitchell and others to flesh out their recom men da tions. The plan, however flawed, became the blueprint for the gener ally success-32 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998 ful employ ment of airpower in World War II. 44 Mitchell's efforts to impact airpower the ory as a uniformed offi cer, while unor tho dox, undoubt edly gener ated much-needed de bate on the subject among the sometimes mori bund War and Navy Depart ment bu reauc racy. This is best il lus trated by a car toon in Mitchell's Winged Defense. It shows War and Navy Depart ment bureau crats in bed to gether fast asleep, oblivious to the sun rising out side their win dow an nounc ing "the fly ing age" as hundreds of airplanes zoom overhead. 4 5 His dream of an in de pend ent air force would not come true until 11 years after his death on 17 Febru ary 1936. "Those who saw him in his last days," Hurley concludes, "reported that he remained adamant to the end." 46 As adamant as Mitchell remained in call ing for the creation of an inde pend ent air force, Marine Corps comman dant Leje une dedi cated all his ener gies to saving the Ma rine Corps from the cutting-room floor, thanks in large part to Maj Earl H. "Pete" El lis, "a brilliant but behav ior ally erratic strate gist." 47 Ellis's 1921 paper, Ad vanced Base Opera tions in Micro ne sia, advo cated amphibi ous attacks to secure advanced naval bases. It shocked the conven tional world. Andrew F. Kre pine vich Jr. offers this analysis: [Ellis] argued that the Marine Corps' future did not rest upon its ability to conduct sustained ground operations, as it had done with distinction in France during World War I. Nor did it lie in earlier missions, such as the defense (his italics) of advanced bases for the Navy. Rather, Ellis argued that in the future the Marines would confront fundamentally new and different kinds of strategic and operational challenges. Principally, he was concerned about the potential threat the Japanese Empire posed to American interests in the Far East. In a conflict with Japan, the Marines' mission would be to assault heavily defended Japanese bases and capture them, thereby permitting the United States to project its power across the Pacific. 48 Com ing just six years af ter the Brit ish de ba cle at Galli poli, Ellis's vision "might have ap peared more akin to madness." 4 9 Far from scrap ping Ellis's ideas, Leje une was intrigued by the possi bili ties of amphibi ous warfare and, upon taking over as comman dant, cre ated the Ex pe di tion ary Force in 1921, based at Quan tico, Virginia. For the next three years, the Expe di tion ary Force maneu vers were an an nual social and military event.
The 1922 exer cise took place at Gettys burg, Pennsyl va nia, and was observed by Presi dent Warren G. Harding, Gen John J. proved completely success ful, and the high est value not only to the force at Quantico, but to the Corps as a whole. In the first place, the ex er cises fur nished a sen sa tional dem on stra tion of the fit ness of the Ma rine Corps and its readi ness to take the field in any emergency, conducted under the very eyes of the Presi dent, his Cabi net and of Con gress." 50 Even though the corps would be unable to con tinue annual training of the Expe di tion ary Force concept due to its require ment to sup port opera tions ranging from chasing Nica ra guan guerril las to garri son ing forces in China, the Marines by late 1924 had es sen tially sold Leje une's Expe di tion ary Force to the Coolidge admini stra tion and a stingy Con gress. 51 Le je une espoused the concept of amphibi ous attacks to secure advanced naval bases and made it "the corner stone of the Corps' op era tional concept for the future." 52 The cur rent comman dant, Gen Charles C. Krulak, . . is a doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and oppor tun is tic ma neu ver." Maneu ver "shatters the enemy's co he sion through a series of rapid, violent, and un ex pected ac tions which cre ate a tur bu lent and rapidly dete rio rat ing situation with which he cannot cope." 54 Fi nally, the contri bu tions of Adm William Mof fett to the Navy's over all doc trine of fleet de fense and force projec tion rank with the con tri bu tions of Mitchell and Leje une. Mof fett led the Navy's Bureau of Aeronau tics for 12 years as its chief propo nent for fleet avia tion and "maintained the delicate balance of per sonal and organ iza tional priori ties better than any other military offi cer of his genera tion."
55 From his early battles with Mitchell, the Washing ton Naval Confer ence, the con struc tion of the car ri ers Lang ley, Sara toga, and Lex ing ton through the depres sion years and into the first days of the Roose velt admini stra tion, Moffett oper ated adroitly around the civil ian and military bureauc racy in Wash ing ton and knew how to get what he wanted.
In Septem ber 1925, two inci dents shook na val aviation. The crash of the airship Shenan doah killed most of its crew, and a PN-9 en route to Hawaii went missing for a few days. Billy Mitchell, who had been exiled to Fort Sam Houston in San Anto nio, Texas, re acted to the inci dents by unleash ing his pent-up frustra tion. Mitchell said the crashes dem on strated "the incom pe tence, criminal neg li gence and almost treason able admini stra tion of our national defense by the Navy and War Depart ments." Two weeks later, in stark contrast to Mitchell, Moffett appeared be fore the Navy's General Board. In his soft Caro lina Low Country style, he reit er ated the fun da men tal soundness of his long-term plans for na val avia tion and as sured the board that les sons had been learned from these ac ci dents. It rep re sented a set back, not the end of na val aviation. These comments soothed the board's anxieties during a diffi cult period in na val aviation when the public spotlight shown brightly on the growing pains of mili tary aviation gener ally. 5 6 At that same hearing, Moffett discussed how he planned to equip theSara toga and Lex ing ton . 57 "He wanted the ships to carry sig nifi cant numbers of strike aircraft organ ized into two bomber squadrons for each carrier." 58 Mof fett be lieved that the Lex ing ton in par ticu lar em bod ied the princi ple of the offen sive in na val warfare. "I am convinced," he said, "that a bombing attack launched from such car ri ers from an unknown point, at an un known instant, with an unknown objec tive, can not be warded off" by any conven tional de fen sive measures. 5 9 It became clear as the Lex ing ton andSara toga en tered serv ice in 1927 that there was an offen sive role for the carrier be yond only support ing battle ships in fleet en gage ment. In their Novem ber 1927 report, the Gen eral Board for mally acknowl-edged as much, conclud ing that "the aircraft carrier, op er at ing fighters and bombers well in ad vance of the battle fleet, was likely to play a ma jor role in future naval actions." 6 0 Mof fett's ideas are still appli ca ble today in dis cuss ing employ ment of naval air. "Carrier or Amphibi ous Ready Group-based aircraft may well be the first, and perhaps the only, tac ti cal aircraft suitable and available for employ ment in an emergency situation arising in a remote area of the world." 61 All three men had differ ing styles and ap proaches to essen tially the same problem: rede fin ing how their service would employ forces or weapon systems in the next war that all three men knew was inevi ta ble. But it was proba bly Billy Mitchell, the most recal ci trant of the trio, who was thinking way out-front. While he espoused a separate air arm, he was also thinking jointness. Among all his rheto ric are some jew els like warn ing of a Japa nese air at tack on Ha waii and rec om mend ing a na- 34 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1998 tional depart ment of defense rather than sepa rate services each with a cabinet-level sec re tary. Mitchell might have approved of
In 1947 the newly independent Air Force won the battle for hearts and minds but lost the doctrine war.
the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which further weak ened the power of the serv ice sec re tar ies and chiefs of staff in favor of empow er ing re gional war-fighting command ers. Gen eral Arnold's comments more than a half century ago still ring true today. What can be learned from study ing how other lead ers in other times in other services faced doc trinal challenges in similar transfor ma tional times? A great deal. The end of World War I and the end of the cold war have many simi lari ties worth noting. American taxpay ers are de mand ing value for money in the ser-vices they pay for and, in an "age of peace," de fense ex pen di tures are closely scruti nized. As Carl Builder has pointed out, the Depart ment of De fense is no longer in a seller's market where a bill for the high cost of de fense is sim ply presented to the American taxpayer for pay ment. It is now a buyer's market, where more frugal taxpay ers have set a limit as to how much they will pay for de fense in a postcold-war world. 6 2 Today's Air Force must be cog ni zant of this paradigm shift in taxpayer at ti tudes.
The United States is moving from a manu fac tur ing base to an information-based econ omy, and, as in the inter war period, the mili tar ies must be able to adapt to warfare and tac tics un known in the twen ti eth cen tury. To make this transi tion with as little disrup tion as possi ble, all services, particu larly the Air Force, must embrace techno logi cal change but at the same time antici pate what Samuel P. Huntington predicts. He says, "Cultural com mu ni ties are replac ing Cold War blocs and the fault lines between civili za tions are be com ing central lines of conflict in global poli tics." 63 That means future wars, perhaps in ter nec ine struggles within nation or blocs, will not nec es sar ily be solved by tech nol ogy.
Af ter World War II, the newly in de pend ent Air Force broke into two camps, the Strate gic Air Com mand and the Tac ti cal Air Com mand, stray ing away from theory and doctrine toward an alle giance to the weapon system or "ca reer field." In 1947 the newly in de pend ent Air Force won the battle for hearts and minds but lost the doc trine war. The ef forts of Leje une, Moffett, and Mitchell can be useful in the Air For ce's at tempt to rec on cile its serv ice doc trine with the logical and statutory require ments that it be a joint ca pa bil ity. In that sense, it should be simpler than the bureau cratic wrangling that occurred in the 1920s and 1930s. But it is not that simple. The very defi ni tion of doctrine is debat able, and doctrine as a topic in the Air Force is of ten an un com fort able conver sa tion.
I. B. Holley's best defini tion of doctrine in his vo lu mi nous writ ing on the sub ject is sim ply "that mode of approach which repeated ex pe ri ence has shown usu ally works best" (em pha sis in the original).
6 4 Gen Ronald Fogle man, in an address last year to the Air Force Air and Space Doctrine Sympo sium, took Hol ley's writ ings on air power doc trine a step further into the joint arena. "Air Force doc trine," ar gued Fo gle man, "should pro vide an inte grat ing framework to tie together the vari ous elements of the Air Force team, to show how these elements work together, and pro vide a basis for inte grat ing airpower with
